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NATURE Or THE PROCEEDINGS 
This lawsuit arises out of the termination of 
Gilmore's employment with the Salt Lake Area Community 
Action Program (Program). It was instituted in the Third 
Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County. The 
Honorable Judge Homer Wilkinson presided. On June 26, 
1987, the Court granted petitioners' motion for summary 
judgment and entered its order dismissing Gilmore's 
complaint in its entirety. 
Gilmore appealed the summary judgment only as it 
pertained to his claim that the Program's written policy 
manual constituted an implied-in-fact contract that 
altered his status as an employee-at-will. The appeal was 
originally taken to the Utah Supreme Court where it was 
then poured over to the Utah Court of Appeals for 
disposition. On July 8, 1989, the Court of Appeals 
entered its decision reversing the lower court's summary 
judgment and remanding for further proceedings. 
This matter is a petition for rehearing pursuant to 
Rule 35, R. Utah Ct. App. Th^ petitioners are th<* Pr^nram 
and its employees and officers who are co-defendants/ 
respondents. 
- 1 -
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The purpose behind Rule 35, R. Utah Ct. App., is to 
insure that the appellate court has properly considered 
all relevant information in rendering its decision, 
Armster v. United States District Court for Cent. Dist., 
806 F.2d 1347 (9th Cir. 1986).1 If the court has 
overlooked or misapprehended authority or some other 
matter material to its decision, a rehearing is 
appropriate. Rule 35(a), R. Utah Ct. App. See also, 
Matter of Estate of Herman
 y 679 P.2d 246, (Nev. 1984). 
The decision to permit a rehearing rests within the sound 
discretion of the Court. Rule 35(c), R. Utah Ct. App. 
STATEMENT OF THF POINTS OF LAW OR FACT 
WHICH PETITIONERS1 CLAIM SHOULD BE 
REHEARD. 
Pursuant to Rule 35, R. Utah Ct. App., Petitioners 
suggest that rehearing is appropriate in this case because 
the Court of Appeals overlooked facts and authority 
material to its decision, and also overlooked one issue 
Rule 35, R. Utah Ct. App. is identical to RuJe 35, R. 
Utah S. Ct., which was drawn, in part, from Rule 40(a) 
FRAP. Advisory Committee Note to Rule 35, R. Utah S. Ct. 
- 2 -
that was pending on appeal. Specjfica]ly, Petitioners 
suggest that the following issues should be reheard: 
1. Whether the case Berube v. Fashion Centre, 
Tnc., Ltd., 104 Utah Adv. Rep. 4 (1989), decided by the 
Utah Supreme Court after the Court of Appeals heard oral 
argument in this case but before its decision, should 
apply retroactiveLy to this case. 
2. Whether summary judgment dismissing 
Gilmore's breach of contract claim against the individual 
employees and officers was proper because they are not 
personally liable even if the Program committed a breach. 
In deciding to reverse the lower court's summary 
judgment, the Court of Appeals relied exclusively on the 
Utah Supreme Court's decision in Berube v. Fashion Centre, 
Inc., Ltd., 104 Utah Adv. Rep 4. The Berube case was 
decided after the Court of Appeals heard argument in this 
case but before its decision. Material to the Court of 
Appeals' decision is whether the Berube case should apply 
retroactively to this case. This was overlooked or not 
considered when the Court of Appeals issued its decision. 
It is the opinion of petitioners' counsel, based upon the 
applicable law, that the Peruho case should not apply 
retroactively. 
3 -
In addition, Gilmore sued not only the Program, but 
its individual employees and officers as well. One issue 
on appeal was whether the summary judgment dismissing 
Gilmore's breach of contract claim against these 
individual employees and officers was proper. It is 
apparent from the Court of Appeals' decision that this 
issue was not considered and was overlooked. Even if the 
Berube case should apply retroactively to this case, 
viewing the facts in a light favorable to Gilmore, the 
individual officers and employees are not liable for any 
breach of contract that the Program may have committed. 
APGUMENT 
POINT I. THE BERUBE CASF SHOULD NOT APPLY 
RETROACTIVELY 10 THIS CASE. 
In McFarland v. Skaggs Companies, Inc., 678 P.2d 298 
(Utah 1984) the Utah Supreme Court set forth the general 
rule concerning the retroactive or prospective application 
of its decisions: 
This Court has held that "[o]rdinarily 
an overruling decision has retroactive 
operation." We have also recognized, 
however, thai under some circumstances 
- 4 -
Man overruling decision will operate 
in the future only.M The leading case 
establishing such a doctrine is a 
United States Supreme Court decision 
entitled Great Northern Railway v. 
Sunburst Oil & Refining Co. The rule 
established in that case, known as the 
Sunburst Doctrine, has been summarized 
previously by this Court as follows: 
The rule is based upon the 
proposition that where persons had 
entered Into coniracts and other 
business relat i ->nsh ips based upon 
justifiable reliance on the prior 
decisions of courts, those persons 
would be substantially harmed if 
retroactive effect were given to 
overruling decisions. An additional 
factor was that retroactive 
operations might greatly burden the 
administration of justice. 
An example of the Utah Supreme Court's application of 
the Sunburst Doctrine is the case Timpanogos Planning & 
Central Utah Water, 690 P.2d 562 (Utah 3984). That ce^e 
involved a statute directing the district courts to 
appoint the water conservancy districts1 boards of 
directors. This statute was declared unconstitutional 
because it violated the separation of powers doctrine. The 
statute was subsequently amended giving the power of 
appointment to the executive branch of government. 
However, this case involved six directors appointed by tho 
district court under the unconstitutional statute. The 
Utah Suprr-m^ Court ruled that its decision declaring the 
statute unconstitutional would operate prospectively only 
because: 1) The water conservancy districts, and perhaps 
others, have conducted their businesses for several 
decades in good faith reliance in the court's prior 
decisions; and, 2) It would work an injustice to cast a 
cloud upon the legality of the districts1 operations for 
those years. 
For tho same reasons, the Utah Supreme Court's 
decision in Berube should not apply retroactively to this 
case. In the Berube case, the Utah Supreme Court 
substantially and significantly changed the at-will 
employment doctrine. Justice Durham, in the majority 
opinion stated: 
We now consider the general status of 
the at-will rule and wnether it is 
appropriate for this court to extend 
or adopt further exceptions to the 
rule . . . Although in the past the 
presumption in favor of at-will 
employment has been difficult to 
overcome, rigid adherence to the at-
will rule is no longer justified or 
advisable. 104 Utah Adv. Rep. at 9 & 
10. 
Justice Zimmerman in his concurring opinion further 
emphasized the overruling effect of the decision and its 
impact on employers. He stated: 
- 6 -
Because the law in this area is in a 
state of flux, and because the at-will 
doctrine has become wel] entrenched in 
our law and any change in it has the 
potential to affect the practices of 
almost every employer in Utah, we must 
proceed with care in recognizing 
exceptions to that doctrine. . . • 
All that being said, we are reversing 
and remanding this matter for trial 
and are signaling a change in the 
employment-at-wiiJ law of Utah. 104 
Utah Adv. Rep. at 16. 
Employers in the State of Utah, including the 
Program, have relied for many years on the employment at-
will doctrine in hiring and firing employees. The court's 
previous rigid adherence to this doctrine is described in 
the Berube case. The Court notes: "This same generaJ 
rule was utilized in a number of Utah cases. See Bullock 
v. Deseret Dodge Truck Center, Inc., ]1 Utah 2d 1, 5, 354 
P. 2d 559, 562 (1960); Crane Co. v. Dahle, 576 p. 2d 870, 
872-73 (Utah, 1978) (citing no authority for the rule). 
Bihlmaier v. Carson, 603 P.2d 790, 792 (Utah 1979)." 104 
Utah Adv. Rep. Ct. 8. As noted by Justice Zimmerman, a 
change in this law by which employers have operated, "wiLI 
affect the practices of almost every employer in Utah." 
104 Utah Adv. Rep. Ct. 16. 
- 7 -
In fact, there is no dispute in this case that when 
the Program hired Gilmore he was hired as an employee-
at-will. See this court's opinion at 3. The program, in 
entering into this at-will relationship, had no reason to 
believe that twelve years later it would face the 
possibility that Gilmore1s 30 months of employment would 
evolve into something more than what the parties intended 
or have since admitted the relationship to be. Moreover, 
under no circumstances could the program have expected 
that twelve years later it would face the possibility of 
paying Gilmore substantial damages, based on a theory of 
an implied in-fact contract, which was not recognized as 
an exception to at-will employment until 1989. Of 
particular interest is the fact that Gilmore was hired 15 
years and fired 12 years before the decision in the Berube 
case. 
As a result, applying Berube retroactively to the 
case will work a severe injustice and substantially 
threaten the Program's existence. If this new law is 
applied retroactively, the program faces the possibility 
of judgment for Gilmore's back pay in a catastrophic 
amount. 
-- 8 -
In other jurisdictions, where the employment-at-will 
doctrine has been modified, the courts have ruled that 
such changes will operate prospectively only. For 
example, in the case Bimbo v. Burdette Tomlin Memorial 
Hospital, 644 F. Supp. 1.33 (D.N.J. 1986), a nurse 
alleged, in one cause of action, that the hospital's 
personnel policies manual constituted an implied 
employment contract. During the pendency of the Bimbo 
case the New Jersey Supreme Court recognized, for the 
first time, an exception to the traditional 
employment-at-will doctrine based on a contract imp]ied 
from a personnel policy manual. Woolley v. Hoffman-La 
Roche, Inc., 99 N.J. 284, 49 A.2d 1257 (1985). The 
Federal District Court in Ri_mbo held: 
In so holding, the WooJ ley court, to 
the extent it went beyond ruling only 
that fundamental principles of basic 
fairness must be adhered to in 
employment relationships clearly broke 
new ground in New Jersey employment 
law. As such, the Woolley decision, 
in our opinion, should not be applied 
retroactively. To apply such a 
significant change in the law 
retroactively would ho distinctly 
unfair to those ei Ceded thereby who 
had previously acted in reliance upon 
the prior state of the Jaw. 644 F. 
Supp. Ct. 1039. 
- 9 -
The court went on to note that the facts giving rise to 
plaintiff's complaint arose more than three years before 
the New Jersey Supreme Court's decision in Woolley. See 
also: Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit 
Authority, 838 F.2d 1411 (5th Cir. 1988); Austin v. City 
of Bisbee, Arizona, 855 F.2d 1429 (9th Cir. 1988); Vigil 
v. Arzola, 699 P.2d 613 (N.M. App. 1983); Ramey v. Harber, 
589 F.2d 753 (4th Cir. 1978); Adkins v. Sky Blue, Inc. 701 
P.2d 549 (Wyo. 1985) . 
The Utah Supreme Court clearly broke new ground in 
Utah employment law by its decision in Berube. Before 
Berube, the at-will employment doctrine was "well 
entrenched in our law." 104 Utah Adv. Rep. Ct. 16. Now 
employers face new liability in its relationships with 
employees. For several decades prior to Berube, the 
program and other employers acted in accordance with the 
state of the law at that time. It is distinctly unfair to 
now subject the program to potentially catastrophic 
liability based on a change in the law that occurred at 
least twelve years affer the farts. This nourt thorrfor 
should rule that the Berube case does not apply 
retroactively to this case. 
- 10 -
POINT II THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT DISMISSING 
GILMORE'S BREACH OF CONTRACT 
CLAIM AGAINST THE INDIVIDUAL 
EMPLOYEES AND OFFICERS IS PROPER 
BECAUSE THEY ARE NOT PERSONALLY 
LIABLE EVEN IF THE PROGRAM 
COMMITTED A BREACH. 
The well-established rule of law is that individual 
employees and officers of a corporation, who act within 
the course and scope of their employment, act under a 
privilege and cannot be held individually liable for the 
corporation's breach of contract. Wise v. Southern 
Pacific Co., 223 Cal. App. 2d 50, 35 Cal. Rptr. 659 
(1953), aff'd on other grounds, 1 Cal. 3d 600, 83 Cal. 
Rptr. 202 (1970). Also see Golden v. Anderson, 256 Cal. 
App. 2d 714, 64 Cal. Rptr. 404 (1967). 
In the Wise case the plaintiff sued his former 
employer for wrongful discharge and a]so sued his former 
co-employees for conspiracy to obtain his discharge. The 
Court of Appeal upheld demurrers to the complaint as to 
the individual defendants and stated: 
Agents and empJoye^s of a corporation 
cannot conspire with their corporate 
principal or employer where the*, act 
in their official capacities on behalf 
of the corporation and not as 
individuals for their individual 
advantage. f^itatjons omUted.l '1 h i s 
rule deri/es Crom the principle that 
ordinarily coi^^r_a^e_ajgents <and 
- II -
employees acting_for_ and on behalf of 
the corporation cannot be held liable 
for inducing a breach of the 
corporation's con t^ _ac t si nee bein g in 
a confidential relationship to the 
corporation their action in this 
respect is privileged. The inducement 
of the breach to be actionable must be 
both wrongful and unprivileged. 
(Citations omitted; emphasis added.) 
Wise, 223 Cal App. 2d at 72-73. 
In GiLmore's claim for breach of contract he has not 
made any allegation that the employees and officers, 
individually named in this suii, acted beyond the scope of 
their employment. The undisputed facts show clearly that 
these individuals acted only in the course of their 
employment, for and on behalf of the Program. Therefore, 
their actions were privileged and they cannot be held 
personally liable for any purported breach of the 
employment contract. Because Gilmore has not alleged that 
these individual defendants acted other than in the course 
and scope of their employment, nor set forth any facts 
showing otherwise, the trial Court's summary dismissal of 
his breach of contract claims against the defendants is 
proper. 
- 12 -
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